The incomplete transformation of institutions of economic policy: from clientelism to competition?

Economic policy in Turkey has gone through significant amount of transformation in the last three decades. While Turkey used to be a closed economy governed by an import-substitution industrialization strategy, starting in the early 1980s it went through substantial liberalization and privatization, and the market mechanism has gained increased importance in the allocation o

When good intentions are not enough: sequential entry and competition in the Turkish mobile industry

A decade into the liberalization of the Turkish mobile industry, the sector remains one of the most concentrated in Europe. In this paper we analyze the links between the regulatory environment and competitive outcomes in the Turkish context. We argue that seven years of duopoly incumbency resulted in a significant first-mover advantage. We then focus on the role of the regulatory tools that could potentially restrain the incumbent operators’ first-mover advantage and stimulate competition: national roaming, interconnection regulation, and number portability

Half glass empty? politics & institutions in the liberalization of the fixed line telecommunications industry in Turkey

This chapter reviews Turkish experience with reform of the fixed line telecommunications industry. It provides an account of earlier incoherent attempts to privatize the incumbent operator in the absence of any regulatory framework or political consensus. It also describes the regulatory framework emerged in early 2000s and discusses the various political-economic and institutional factors behind its weak implementation, and hence its limited success in promoting competition

Glass half empty? politics and institutions in the liberalization of the fixed line telecommunications industry in Turkey

This chapter reviews Turkish experience with reform of the fixed line telecommunications industry. It provides an account of earlier incoherent attempts to privatize the incumbent operator in the absence of any regulatory framework or political consensus. It also describes the regulatory framework emerged in early 2000s and discusses the various political-economic and institutional factors behind its weak implementation, and hence its limited success in promoting competition